Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote that "The purpose [of the doctrine of separation of powers] was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction... to save the people from autocracy."' He insisted that conflict between the three federal branches was a necessary evil.
Since May of 1969 the Supreme Court, the pinnacle of the federal judicial department, has found itself embroiled in controversy to an extent unprecedented since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1937 court-packing attempt. This most recent testing of Brandeis' thesis began with the pressures brought to bear, rightly or wrongly but with obvious success, to force Abe Fortas off the high bench. With a new vacancy to be filled, conflict boiled up twice again in rapid succession as President Richard M. Nixon practiced his own more orthodox approach to reconstituting a Court whose philosophy had become increasingly distasteful to the newly elected Chief Executive and his followers.
The resulting prolongation of the Fortas vacancy prevented the Supreme Court from attending to some of its important business. Of greater longrange significance, it placed the Court once again in the eye of a public storm which would give it a buffeting it could ill afford. Even so, this institution that has lived for controversy exhibited throughout an admirable if perhaps false calm. And, as the students who are the authors of this I Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
inaugural review of Supreme Court decisions in the criminal field will demonstrate in the pages ahead, it somehow managed to go about much of its work.
The thirteen-month interregnum between Fortas and Harry A. Blackmun exposed the sort of machinations that frequently underlie the only meaningful form of direct political control over the Supreme Court, the nomination and confirmation powers.
2 President Nixon used his authority in an open and unabashed effort to influence future judicial policy and, at the same time and by the same effort, to repay campaign debts run up in the course of what has been denominated somewhat inflatedly as his Southern Strategy. The President made clear his intention to pick for the Supreme Court men who could be counted on to be stinting in their use of judicial power-men who, he said, would be "strict constructionists," whatever that term meant to him 4 (1970) . 4President Nixon would probably not care to partake of the argument-a tenable one-that William 0. Douglas, despite his occasionally cavalier approach to opinion-writing, is a strict constructionist in the Jeffersonian sense in which that unsatisfactory phrase is most commonly employed. This, of course, is not the place for that argument but anyone who doubts that it can be made might take a look at Douglas's concurring opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39-40 (1968 
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clearly, and of Blackmun arguably, were in execution of the presidential specifications for reconstructing the Court. The United States Senate, to its enduring credit, employed its power to extract from the executive branch a higher degree of responsibility than was exhibited in the first two of these nominations.
Richard Nixon was not doing something untried by his predecessors. History has revealed the tendency of presidents to add to the judiciary men who, at the time of their appointment, apparently stood for principles which the then chief executive would himself have espoused were he on the bench. 5 In its turn, the Senate-regardless of whether or not its majority was drawn from the President's political party-has ordinarily confirmed such nominees, granting to the President a certain ideological leeway in filling judicial vacancies. -6 (1965) . 8 In the mid-Nineteenth Century, however, the Senate-eyeing ideological differences over slavery and Reconstruction issues-rejected fully one-quarter of the names submitted to it for the Supreme Court. See J. HARP s, ThE ADvIcE AN CONSENT oP TE SENATE 46-98 (1968) . The number of unsuccessful nominations to the Court now stands, after 180 years -of American judicial history, at twenty-six. Eleven were rejected by a recorded vote of the Senate; seven were withdrawn by the President when it became clear that Senate approval could not be obtained. As to the remaining eight the Senate either took no action or announced that action would be "postponed" indefinitely. Six other nominees were approved by the Senate but refused to accept appointment; a seventh, Edwin M. Stanton, was confirmed by the Senate but died before he could be commissioned and sworn in. For a detailed tabulation of nominations that were declined or rejected, see Swindler, supra note 2, at 536. 8 There is no need to speculate regarding the direction Mr. Justice Blackmun will take in the future. One of the most reliable sources for such predictions has now spoken. Jeane Dixon, the well-known psychic, reports that "Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun will turn out to be much more of a strict constructionist in criminal matters than his followers anticipated." Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1970, § 5, at 13, col. 2.
OPresident Nixon described the Senate's rejection of nominee G. Harrold Carswell as an "act of regional discrimination" and added that "This Senate as it is presently constituted will not approve a man from the South who shares my view .... " NEwswEEx, April 20, 1970, at 35. The President was silent a few months later when the citizens of Judge Carswell's own state, Florida, rejected his bid for a seat in the U.S. Senate.
10 The Constitution makes no provision for minimum qualifications for judges. It does not specify patterns of education and training. Not even the requisites of citizenship and minimum age imposed upon the President and members of the Congress are applied to the federal judiciary. This void could have been filled by either the executive or the legislative branch but both have declined to set formal qualifications for the federal bench. See J. GROssnsAw, LAWYERS AND JuDGEs 23 (1965). Non-governmental guardians of the public's expectations are usually vague when discussing judicial qualifications. It is not much help when, for example, a New York Times editorialist delivers his newspaper of the pronouncement that "Judges are something special in our form of government; the most exacting standards can be none too high." Editorial, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1963, at 28, col. 1. For a long time, however, there has existed the notion that intellect and integrity are elemental aspects of the appropriate formula. Thus Francis Bacon said, "Judges ought to be more learned The Senate's vote in the Haynsworth episode evidenced a gnawing doubt about the appointment of a man whose judicial conduct now and again bore at least an appearance of impropriety. Judge Haynsworth's honesty and integrity were not directly impugned by responsible spokesmen; his sensitivity to ethical norms and to the necessity for avoiding even the appearance of evil were assuredly called into question. If the Senate's judgment in the Haynsworth matter seemed harsh to some, it nonetheless reiterated one standard against which the executive, in the discharge of a key obligation to the nation, must measure every judicial nominee.
Judge G. Harrold Carswell's rebound nomination raised the second pivotal question that chief executives are supposed to ask themselves before submitting Supreme Court nominations to the Senate for its advice and consent. When a potential nominee's stock portfolio and his conscience appear to be in order, judgment as to the propriety of his appointment must rest on professional qualities--on the demonstrated power and range of his intellect. Carswell's nomination at first seemed the ideal sequel to the abortive effort to elevate Haynsworth: the Florida judge apparently had almost no capital assets and none of those he had appeared to pose any conflict of interests. As cautious Senators and various outside organizations scrutinized Carswell's record, however, one unsettling fact began to emerge. Aside from a few indications that he was or at least in times past had been something of a racist, Carswell's record as lawyer and jurist seemed indistinguishable from that of countless other lawyers and judges in the nation. Appointment to the Supreme Court is the highest honor that can come to a member of the legal profession and many a lawyer and many a layman began to question what Harrold Carswell had ever done to deserve the ultimate prize.
Despite one Senator's straightfaced suggestion that the mediocre segment of America's population was entitled to a representative on the country's highest court," the charge that Carswell lacked a crucial qualification was not casually to be tossed aside. coupled with experience and common sense, is the basic working equipment of the effective casedecider. Furthermore, resolving controversies is not the judge's only function. As Eugene V. Rostow once put it, "The Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vast national seminar." 12 The corp-us of Supreme Court opinions serves as the nation's textbook on such vital and complex subjects as the living Constitution, the functioning of federalism and the answers to an endless stream of "federal questions." Elevation to the Court requires of a man (or, one of these days, a woman) that degree of intellectual power and clarity which will equip the nominee to act as educator of the American people on the nature and meaning of law. The Senate looked at Judge Harrold Carswell with care and decided not to name him to the faculty.
At last Mr. Nixon faced up to the fact that the Senate of the United States would not permit presidential deviation from fundamental standards in the filling of the Fortas vacancy. He sent up the name of Harry Blackmun, whose attributes could survive measurement against those refined standards, and the Senate--with an almost audible sigh of relief-confirmed his nomination.
The prolonged presidential delay in submitting a name that the Senate could in good faith act upon favorably did delay Court treatment of a few crucial issues, such as the constitutionality of the death penalty.
3 What is perhaps even more frustrating to students preparing an analysis of a year's criminal adjudication, the long delay forestalled meaningful appraisal of President Nixon's progress in reshaping the Court in his own image.
The performance in the past year of Mr. Nixon's first Supreme Court appointee, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, provides only fragmentary indicia of the President's success at reining in the Court. In the criminal law field, however, Chief Justice Burger has supplied some evidence, mostly by the company he keeps on the Court, that at least in time he will be able to do what he was sent to the Court to do, that is, halt if not reverse the activist trend of what has come to be known compendiously as the Warren Court. If there is any discernible thread running through the major constitutional criminal law opinions written or joined in by the new Chief Justice during the 1 2 Rostow, The Denocratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAuv. L. REv. 193, 208 (1952) .
13 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
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October Term, 1969 Term, -1970 , it would have to be described as a reluctance to move much beyond the pales driven by the Warren Court. Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School has called Burger's -first term "the year of the pause." 1 4 But "pause" implies the eventual resumption of a higher level of activity. It is by no means certain that Warren Burger's Supreme Court will resume the velocity of Earl Warren's. The Court remained an active one during the last term but its forward movement can be measured in jurisprudential inches instead of the old Warren miles. The Burger Court moved not as a vehicle picking up momentum but as one to which powerful brakes were being applied. Shifting the metaphor, perhaps the post-Warren year could properly be dubbed the year of the gathering lull.
Although Burger's first year was one of de--celeration, it was not, by and large, a year for cancelling past gains. The Supreme Court, during its past term, showed continued sensitivity in several controversial sectors. It did so, most frequently, over its Chief Justice's dissent.
In Toussie v. United States, 15 for example, the Court held that a young man who had failed to register for the draft could not be penalized for this failure on the basis of a prosecution brought eight years after his initial registration date. The five-year statute of limitation, it was held, began its run six days after the boy's eighteenth birthday. The Court declined to declare the offense a continuing one; had it done so, the limitation period would have commenced only after the defendant's twenty-sixth birthday, exposing him to prosecution until he was thirty-one years old. The Chief Justice joined in an ill-tempered dissenting opinion written by Justice White.
6
In Gutknecht v. United States" the Court struck down the Selective Service Administration's "delinquency regulations" as being without statutory authorization, thereby displaying an alert appreciation of the exigencies inherent in a bureaucracy that becomes, on occasion, savagely self-serving. Chief Justice Burger joined in a substantially narrower concurrence written by Justice Potter Stewart.
It was held in 
1970]
ness of long-range and over-general predictions about how judges will behave is reaffirmed by Ashe v. Swenson, 2 8 another double jeopardy case involving that slippery concept, collateral estoppel. In Ashe one is confronted by a sharp split between the new Chief Justice and, of all people, Potter Stewart, with Stewart taking the "liberal" approach and Burger, in dissent, adopting a distinctly "conservative" stance.
In some respects the most intriguing case to come before the Supreme Court during the past term was Illinois v. Allen 2 9 , in which an Illinois trial judge, after demonstrating what is generally contemplated by the phrase "the patience of Job," excluded an obstreperous 0 defendant from his own trial. In Allen the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Black and joined by Chief Justice Burger, rebuffed the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a criminal accused, no matter how irrepressible, can never be barred from the courtroom ". . .and that the judge's ultimate remedy... is to bind and gag him." 30 The defendant was appearing pro se, although the trial court had appointed counsel to "sit in and protect the record." 397 U.S. at 339. Incapable of conducting his own defense, the defendant began berating the judge. The high point of the dialogue was reached when the defendant announced, "When I go out for lunchtime you're [i.e., the trial judge] going to be a corpse here." Id.
(1) bind and gag him... ; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly." 11
It is reasonably dear that the first expedient on Black's list was intended as a measure to be resorted to only after all else had failed. Although hedging somewhat toward the end of his opinion, justice Black explicitly stated that ". . . no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort." 86 Justice Brennan, concurring, stressed the same point, remarking that "It offends not only judicial dignity and decorum, but also that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." 7
The Allen decision is badly misread by those who suggest that it places a general imprimatur on the gagging and shackling of the defendant Bobby G. Seale, co-chairman of the militant Black Panther Party, during the Democratic Convention riot conspiracy case. There the trial judge employed gag and thong as a first or, at best, second and hardly last resort. Seale, insistent upon either the presence of the defense attorney of his own choice or the right to represent himself, was accorded neither; the trial judge refused a relatively brief delay in the trial's commencement to permit participation by Seale's counsel and thereafter steadfastly refused to experiment even briefly with a pro se effort by Seale. At the outset of his troubles with Seale the trial judge-who, after all, was dealing with a layman-was archly cryptic in suggesting the possibility of a contempt citation.* 35 397 U.S. at 344. Seale inquired whether he was being threatened with a contempt citation, the trial judge responded, "I will not argue with you." Rec. 3146. Later the trial judge, without explanation of their legal significance, employed the terms "contemptuous" and "contumacious" in connection with Seale's conduct, Rec. 3600, but thei reverted to his original phraseology, e.g., Rec. 3601, 3641, 3642. When the trial reached the 4,610th page of transcript the trial judge for the first time explicitly advised Seale that he was "... in contempt of court,'" adding retroactively that "... you have a lot of contemptuous conduct against you." Rec. 4610-11. On only one occasion did the trial court with any explicitness make a contemporaneous finding, on the record, of contempt, Rec. 4610, and on no occasion did the court intimate the possible penalty for Seale's continued interruptions. Then, suddenly, the trial court began to talk not of its contempt power but of its. 
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And at no time did the trial court employ the expedient of excluding Seale from the courtroom until he promised to remain docile. 9 Finally, and most inexplicable of all, the trial court delayed for an unconscionable period of time before adopting the simplest and most dearly indicated expedient, which, was to sever Seale from this 'multipledefendant case and put him to a separate trial at which, presumably, his lawyer, fully recuperated from the illness that had prevented his appearance at the original trial, could be present.
40
In view of the mistrial eventually declared as to Seale, and the concomitant ordering of a new trial as to him, the propriety of the trial court's handling of Seale will arise in two contexts rather than three. It will arise when reviewing courts consider whether Seale's conviction of contempt of court is supportable;
4 ' it will also arise when the October 29, 1969, the trial judge directed the marshals to "Take that defendant into the room in there and deal with him as he should be dealt with in this circumstance." Rec. Professor Kalven, who is not given to overwrought comment, believes that "It was politically reckless and intrinsically unfair to have permitted matters to get to such an impasse." Id. As one who was present in the courtroom during the pertinent period, I can attest the accuracy of Professor Kalven's observation.
4 It is not possible to agree completely with the thesis advanced by prosecutors Flaum and Thompson in their article, supra note 29 at 337, thatit is "specious" to suggest ".... that the Allen opinion does not purport to deal with the defendant whose unruly conduct is 'provoked' by rulings of the trial court to which he takes exception" (authors' emphasis). A litigant is surely not free to react in unorthodox fashion to mere "provocations" occurring in a courtroom but this truism has little to do with the complicated situation of the defendant Seale in the "Chicago 8" case and it is at least in part to Seale's conduct that Flaum and Thompson point. The defendant Allen had been deprived of no apparent constitutional rights. Having refused the helping hand of legal counsel, Allen was for no good reason being intimidating and obnoxious as a consequence either of calculation or of mental illness. In the "Chicago 8" trial Seale had been deprived of the services of the lawyer of his choice by the trial judge's actions and was attempting in the main to act pro se, arguing motions and cross-examining witnesses who Jhad testified against him.
Justice Douglas, concurring in Allen, carefully appellate courts consider the impact of the Seale fiasco on the fair-trial rights of his seven codefendants. Crim. No. 70-195 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (Hoffman, J.) . 61 Professor Anthony Amsterdam has suggested that "... virtually every trial is a political trial when you look at it in a social context. We operate at a time of gravest doubt of the potential of the judicial system to deliver justice to anyone outside the mainstream. Thus, the trial of a poor black in Detroit for a misdemeanor is a political trial where neither the judge, jury, cop nor penal system is attuned to the life-style of the defendant in any way. Radicals on the left historically have used ...
[disruptive] tactics to incite the extreme right with the calculated design of fostering a regime of repression from which the radicals on the left hope to emerge as the ultimate victor. The left in that role is the provocateur. The Constitution was not designed as an instrument for that form of rough-and-tumble contest. The social compact has room for tolerance, patience, and restraint, but not for sabotage and violence. Trials involving that spectacle strike at the very heart of constitutional government. That is the fact that the Supreme Court, during the Burger years, will probably have one opportunity after another to answer the unique questions generated by political and subversive cases. The answer to the problems posed by subversive cases is to define workable procedures for conducting them. On the other hand, as Justice Douglas knows, the answer to the special difficulties inhering in political cases may ".... involve the designing of constitutional methods for putting an end to them." " Constructing the details of such answers demands such men as Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter....
The Senate of the United States in the year just past advised the President of the United States that it will not consent to the knowing appointment of lesser men to the nation's highest court. Law students analysing future Supreme Court terms can tell us whether Richard M. Nixon and his successors have acted upon the Senate's advice. That may not be the least service supplied by the student editors of this journal. Id.
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